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During the Senate debate on the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CER-
CLA"),' Senator George Mitchell reminded his colleagues of the
Act's limited scope:
Under this bill, if a toxic waste discharge injures both a tree
and a person, the tree's owner, if it is a government, can
promptly recover.., for the cost of repairing the damage, but
the person cannot. In effect, at least as to the superfund, it is
all right to kill people, but not trees.2
Senator Mitchell made his comment in the wake of a broad com-
promise that allowed CERCLA to pass both houses of Congress.
The final bill deleted much of what was to make the Act "compre-
hensive," including private actions for damages and medical ex-
penses.3 The Act that finally was signed into law by President
Carter authorizes government cleanup of hazardous waste sites,
but does not provide for compensation to those who are physically
harmed by hazardous waste.4 On its own terms, CERCLA redresses
public, not private wrongs.
Congress created CERCLA because other federal laws, includ-
ing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
t B.A. 1987, The University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of
Chicago.
' Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980), codified at 42 USC §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp
1991). The Act is known popularly as "Superfund" because it authorizes creation of the
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. Because this Comment does not address recov-
eries under the Fund, it will use the acronym CERCLA exclusively.
I 96th Cong, 2d Sess (Nov 24, 1980), in 126 Cong Rec 30941 (Nov 24, 1980) (statement
of Senator Mitchell).
' See Robert C. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33
Baylor L Rev 253, 253 (1981). In 1980, Mr. Eckhardt was chairman of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,
and as such was a participant in the CERCLA debates.
4 Exxon Corp. v Hunt, 475 US 355, 375 (1986).
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("RCRA"),5 were unable to control the mounting environmental
threat of hazardous waste disposal sites.' Specifically, none of the
federal programs in existence sanctioned the initiation of environ-
mental cleanup or remedial actions, nor could owners of aban-
doned or inactive sites be held liable for cleanup costs.7 Congress
needed a stronger statute that would enable the government to
clean up waste sites and then recover cleanup costs from the re-
sponsible parties."
Under CERCLA, the government has two methods of cleaning
up hazardous waste sites. First, it can use money from the Hazard-
ous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund) to clean up a
hazardous waste site,9 and then sue the responsible party or parties
to recover the cleanup costs.10 Alternatively, when there is an "im-
minent and substantial endangerment to the public health or wel-
fare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance," it can order the private parties respon-
sible for wastes to clean up the site themselves.11
CERCLA has no provision that allows private parties to sue
for damages for personal injuries. Section 107(a)(4)(B) of the Act
nevertheless makes responsible parties liable for "any [ ] necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan."' 2 Courts have held that this section
authorizes private individuals to clean up hazardous sites on their
own and then to recover their expenses from the responsible par-
ties.13 This Comment addresses whether private parties can re-
cover medical monitoring costs under § 107(a)(4)(B). Such suits
are brought by parties who wish to assess the effects of hazardous
wastes on the environment by monitoring human bodies. This
Comment will show that medical monitoring costs are consistent
I Pub L No 94-580, 90 Stat 2795 (1976), codified as an amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act at 42 USC §§ 6901-6987 (1988 & Supp 1991). RCRA allows the EPA to regu-
late future hazardous waste creation, transportation, storage, and disposal. It applies only to
existing hazardous waste sites that become inactive.
I S Rep No 96-848, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 11 (1980).
7 Id at 10-12.
8 Id at 12.
See 42 USC § 9611.
10 42 USC §§ 9604(a), 9607(a).
" 42 USC § 9606(a).
1" 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B). Subsequent textual references to this provision will be to §
107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.
11 See, for example, Walls v Waste Resource Corp., 761 F2d 311, 318 (6th Cir 1985);
Artesian Water Co. v New Castle County, 851 F2d 643, 648 (3d Cir 1988).
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with CERCLA's statutory purpose and design, and the costs
should therefore be granted in actions brought under
§ 107(a)(4)(B). It will suggest that private suits, including medical
monitoring cost recovery actions, are important enforcement mech-
anisms that Congress created to further CERCLA's public goals.
Finally, the Comment suggests a test that courts can use to iden-
tify the most important criteria in medical monitoring suits, and to
distinguish genuine suits from frivolous ones.
I. MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS UNDER CERCLA
The Senate bill that became CERCLA originally contained a
provision for private recovery of medical expenses." To achieve bi-
partisan support for the bill, however, Congress deleted all of the
Act's express private action provisions.' 5 Medical treatment ex-
penses necessitated by exposure to hazardous wastes thus are not
recoverable under CERCLA. The Act does, however, authorize pri-
vate parties to assist the government's cleanup enterprise. Individ-
uals may clean up waste sites and recover their "necessary costs of
response" from the responsible polluters. This Comment argues
that medical costs that qualify as response costs-expenses in-
curred for attempting to clean up a waste site-may be recover-
able. Such costs would include medical monitoring costs expended
to determine the extent of environmental harms, but would not
include expenditures for treating individuals for illnesses caused
by those harms.
A. Claims for Medical Monitoring Costs
A typical private party suit under CERCLA may have many
stages. As will be seen below, the first step in a response cost case
may be some form of testing. Often, before a party can begin re-
moving hazardous wastes from a site, it must determine the extent
of the problem through a series of tests. For instance, in Brewer v
Ravan, the plaintiffs sued to recover the costs of "soil testing,
14 S 1480, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (Jul 11, 1979), in 125 Cong Rec 17991 (Jul 11, 1979).
16 There was great debate in Congress over whether CERCLA should be broadly regula-
tory or very limited in scope. The original House bill was not nearly as ambitious as the
Senate version of CERCLA. See text accompanying notes 31-43. See also, for example, Sen-
ator Mitchell's remarks: "The guiding principle of those who wrote S. 1480 was that those
found responsible for harm caused by chemical contamination should pay for the costs of
that harm. We are abandoning that principle.., when the damage involved is to a person."
126 Cong Rec at 30941 (cited in note 2).
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water monitoring, and medical tests and medical screening."' 16 The
court recognized the claim under § 107(a)(4)(B) (against a sum-
mary judgment motion), including the costs for medical testing.1
The plaintiffs in Brewer wished to test the health of the local
population to determine how far the hazardous waste contamina-
tion had spread. It is not clear exactly what procedures were
planned because apparently the parties settled the case before the
monitoring program could be instituted. It is likely, though, that
local residents would have been given complete physical exams on
a regular basis, and would have had endocrinological and genetic
testing as well.' Tissue samples of people also would have been
tested as a way of gauging the effects of the hazardous wastes at
varying distances from the actual site.' 9 In effect, the Brewer plain-
tiffs intended to use medical testing as a tool for preparing a re-
moval action under CERCLA. Plaintiffs like those in Brewer con-
sider medical testing to be a "necessary cost of response."
B. Recovery of Investigatory Costs
Response costs may include investigatory costs incurred in the
initial testing of a contaminated site. Medical monitoring cost suits
are more complex than most response cost actions under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA because they involve an initial hurdle
not present in most cases: whether costs can be recovered before a
party actually incurs them. Although courts once were divided on
whether such prospective response costs were recoverable under
the Act, most courts now read § 107(a)(4)(B) to permit recovery of
prospective response costs, also called investigatory costs.2 0 Courts
that uphold investigatory costs look to § 101(23) of CERCLA
,6 680 F Supp 1176, 1179 (M D Tenn 1988).
17 Id.
' These descriptions are for the most part conjectural. For a case in which a court
approved a program similar to the one described in the text (albeit for a common law medi-
cal damages claim), see Merry v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 684 F Supp 847, 852 (M D Pa
1988). See also Shirley A. Conibear, M.D., Proposed Medical Surveillance For Residents of
Gettysburg, PA Whose Water Has Been Contaminated 7-18 (Oct 8, 1987), as referred to in
Merry, 684 F Supp at 851 (report on file with U Chi L Rev).
28 Id.
'0 See, for example, Wickland Oil Terminals v ASARCO, Inc., 792 F2d 887, 892 (9th
Cir 1986) (expenses for testing groundwater); Artesian Water, 851 F2d at 651 (same); Vel-
sicol Chemical Corp. v Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 15 Envir L Rptr 20103, 20105 (E D
Ten 1984) (expenses for determining environmental damage from coal tar sludge deposited
in holding tank on property). The Fifth Circuit, however, does allow recovery of investiga-
tory costs. Bulk Distribution Centers v Monsanto Co., 589 F Supp 1437, 1450 (S D Fla
1984) (all expenses must be incurred before they can be recovered).
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which defines removals as "such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances. '21 They note that this definition does not
distinguish removal costs that already have been incurred from
ongoing or future costs in preparation for an action; both types of
costs serve the statutory function.
In Artesian Water Co. v New Castle County,22 for example,
the appellate court affirmed the decision of the district court to
award a water company both the costs it had already incurred in
cleaning up its wells and the costs necessary to monitor and evalu-
ate the impact of the release of the hazardous substances on sur-
rounding wells. The district court had followed the reasoning of
Wickland Oil Terminals v ASARCO, Inc., in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that "[t]he distinction . . . between investigatory costs
and on-site cleanup costs is immaterial under section 107(a). '23
The reasoning of Wickland Oil and Artesian Water is now the ac-
cepted reading of §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 101(23).24 Thus, a party can
recover response costs not only for past expenditures, but for ongo-
ing and future expenses as well.
C. Medical Monitoring Costs as Investigatory Costs
Expenses for monitoring the effects of hazardous wastes on
peoples' bodies are consistent with investigatory expenses that
courts often grant. Medical monitoring costs must be distinguished
from direct medical treatment costs. As noted earlier, Congress
unambiguously removed recovery of costs incurred for medical
treatment from CERCLA before its passage. Nevertheless, this
Comment argues that costs for monitoring medical symptoms
caused by hazardous waste releases 25 can be characterized as inves-
tigatory costs, and therefore are recoverable under § 107(a)(4)(B).26
21 42 USC § 9601(23) (emphasis added).
22 851 F2d at 644-45.
22 792 F2d at 892.
24 See text accompanying note 20. The Fifth Circuit is the one possible holdout, see id,
though it has never had an appellate decision on point.
26 CERCLA defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring... or dispos-
ing [of hazardous wastes] into the environment ..... " 42 USC § 9601(22).
26 A recent case has raised the possibility of permitting medical monitoring costs only
when they have already been expended. See Cook v Rockwell International Corp., 755 F
Supp 1468 (D Colo 1991) ("If plaintiffs have incurred no cognizable response costs, it is
appropriate to... [dismiss] the CERCLA claim at the outset."). This appears to be the only
case to use this approach.
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These monitoring costs are not a form of reimbursement for per-
sonal harms, but are "costs of response" that are incurred by par-
ties who test the extent of the environmental harm as a prelude to
cleaning up a waste site.
II. CERCLA's PURPOSE AND DESIGN
When a court decides whether to permit recovery for medical
monitoring costs-or any other response cost-under
§ 107(a)(4)(B), it must determine whether a recovery would com-
port with the purposes of a statute that is "not a paradigm of clar-
ity or precision."27 In interpreting the specific provisions of CER-
CLA, a court must thus synthesize various strands of meaning.
Nevertheless, many of the goals and purposes of the Act (such as
forcing polluters to pay the costs of cleanups) were expressed
clearly. Congress merely left ambiguous its preferred methods of
achieving those goals. The courts' ultimate role, then, is to decide
whether medical monitoring costs are a reasonable means of fur-
thering the Act's broad purposes.
This section will discuss CERCLA's legislative history and
purpose, and will outline the Act's design. It will show that CER-
CLA was enacted with a broad "public health" purpose, and that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) was designed to allow private parties to further the
Act's broad goals. It then will discuss the roles the government and
private litigants play in achieving those goals.
A. CERCLA's Legislative History
The congressional background of CERCLA is one of compro-
mise. The purpose of many specific provisions is often unclear be-
cause much of the congressional debate focused on provisions that
ultimately were not included in the statute, and because the Act
was passed under a bipartisan agreement that excluded meaningful
floor debate.28 In fact, Congress salvaged the Act from at least
three different bills that had failed to pass.29 A lame duck Congress
27 See Artesian Water, 851 F2d at 648.
21 126 Cong Rec at 30916 (cited in note 2) (statement of Senator Byrd) ("We have come
to the conclusion, based on their desire as well as ours to achieve a feasible solution, consid-
ering the time constraints and other factors, that Senator B[aker] and I will cosponsor the
amendment that has been worked out and that we will oppose any amendments thereto.").
For a narrative history of CERCLA's legislative background, see Frank P. Grad, A Legisla-
tive History of The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 8 Colum J Envir L 1 (1982).
29 Most notably, HR 85, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 27, 1980), in 126 Cong Rec 23567
(Aug 27, 1980); HR 7020, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 2, 1980), in 126 Cong Rec 25894 (Sep 17,
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hastily assembled it, fearing that the incoming President would not
support any environmental legislation that required new federal
expenditures. 30 Despite these uncertainties regarding the act's pas-
sage, however, one can interpret CERCLA's response cost provi-
sion using two relevant guides: the general purpose of the Act and
the specific purpose of that provision. The broad purpose of the
Act is to clean up the environment for the public good; the nar-
rower purpose of the response cost section is to facilitate that
broad goal through private activities.
1. The broad purpose of the Act.
The Senate report that accompanied CERCLA's passage
began:
Modern chemical technology has produced miracles which
have greatly improved this Nation's standard of living. But
the increased generation of hazardous substances associated
with these new products has proved to be a serious threat to
our Nation's public health and environment.3 '
The Senate felt that it must take strong measures to protect such
abstract concepts as the "public health" and the "environment."
The broad purpose of the Act addresses those concerns.3 2 CER-
CLA serves the public good; it is oriented to the public law aspects
of environmental regulation. It is not concerned with an individ-
ual's health or with damages to individuals' property.
The Act's purpose must also be viewed in light of Congress's
desire to address many of the problems faced by society as a whole
as a result of chemical contamination.3 For example, the Senate
report noted many dramatic ecological disasters (such as the "Val-
ley of the Drums" in Kentucky and the Love Canal debacle in New
1980); S 1480, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (Nov 24, 1980), in 126 Cong Rec 30898 (Nov 24, 1980). S
1480 nominally was passed and became CERCLA, but the final version was drastically dif-
ferent from the original. Grad, 8 Colum J Envir L at 1 (cited in note 28).
30 Grad, 8 Colum J Envir L at 19 (cited in note 28). Ronald Reagan's election to the
White House necessitated the last-minute compromise that limited CERCLA's scope as well
as its budget. The lame duck President and Congress worked quickly to pass a hazardous
waste cleanup law before Reagan would take office.
31 S Rep No 96-848 at 2 (cited in note 6).
' For example, § 106(a) empowers the government to take emergency actions in the
case of "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health." 42 USC § 9606(a)
(emphasis added).
13 S Rep No 96-848 at 10-12 (cited in note 6).
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York) that adversely affected entire communities.34 To help
achieve the goal of protecting society as a whole, Congress estab-
lished strict liability to ensure that responsible parties would bear
the costs of the damage they cause to society.35
2. The purpose of the private response cost provision.
The private-party response cost provision of § 107(a)(4)(B)
has a specific, more defined purpose. Like the rest of the Act, it
arose from compromise: Congress dropped provisions permitting
private actions for damages, but retained provisions providing for
privately-initiated cleanup actions. The first bill to resemble what
was to become CERCLA, the Senate's "Environmental Emergency
Response Act"3 6 had covered both private cleanup actions and pri-
vate damages suits. Included in that bill, S 1480, were provisions
for victim compensation for economic and medical damages, in ad-
dition to a scheme of government and private-party responses to
hazardous waste emergencies.3 7 The bill's victim compensation sec-
tions were limited,38 but their inclusion shows that the Senate con-
sidered creating a federal "toxic tort" to bridge the gap between
public protection and private compensation. More importantly,
though, was the private response cost provision. S 1480 originally
was drafted to permit private parties to recover for damages to
their persons and property and also for costs of cleaning up on
their own as an enforcement mechanism for the overall goal of
cleaning up the environment. In the compromise that passed, the
latter scheme was retained as § 107(a)(4)(B).
34 Id.
Id at 13.
36 S 1480, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (Jul 11, 1979), in 125 Cong Rec 17988 (Jul 11, 1979).
See id at 17991.
36 As proposed on the Senate floor, § 4(a)(2) of the bill was to provide for:
(2) all damages for economic loss or loss due to personal injury or loss of natural re-
sources resulting from [ ] a discharge, release, or disposal, including-
(A) any injury to, destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property, including
relocation costs;
(E) any loss of income or profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from in-
jury to or destruction of real or personal property or natural resources ...
(F) all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including rehabilitation costs, due to personal
injury ....
Id. After the committee considered the bill, the compensation scheme was limited to recov-
ery only for (1) all medical expenses and (2) 100% of lost wages for the first year of injury
and 80% of lost wages for the second year. See S 1480, §§ 4(a), 4(c), 4(n) (cited in note 29);
S Rep No 96-848 at 23 (cited in note 6).
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The House's alternative to the Senate bill was more limited.
The House considered a bill to amend RCRA, entitled the "Haz-
ardous Waste Act of 1980."s This bill included provisions for regu-
lating hazardous waste sites via reporting, cleanup, and monitor-
ing,40 but allowed cost reimbursement only for governmental
authorities.4 The House bill did not contain any provisions for
compensating victims and also excluded private party cleanup-cost
actions. The House bill, in contrast to the early Senate versions of
CERCLA, focused completely on the government's role in hazard-
ous waste cleanups.
In the final compromise bill, the Senate removed the victim
compensation sections, but retained the private right of action for
recovering response costs in § 107(a)(4)(B).42 The discussion on the
Senate floor focused on what was cut and glossed over what was
left intact,43 but it is uncontroverted that the Senate rejected the
House's attempt to deny private parties a role in cleanups. The
Senate bill had always included the scheme for allowing private
enforcement of the public goal of cleaning up the environment, and
this scheme passed into law. The retention of the private enforce-
ment mechanism in the wake of other great compromises is the
starting point for evaluating private actions under CERCLA.
The legislative history elucidates two points crucial to consid-
ering the issue of medical monitoring costs. First, CERCLA has a
very broad, public-minded purpose. All of the Act's sections must
be construed against this standard. Response cost actions, there-
fore, should be favored if they can advance the Act's broad pur-
pose of protecting the "public health." Second, and more impor-
tantly for the purposes of this Comment, Congress made many
compromises, but never cut the private right to recover response
costs. Though it never spelled out clearly its desired means for ac-
complishing CERCLA's broad goals, Congress left private actions
available. Based on a construction of the legislative history dis-
cussed above, this Comment contends that medical monitoring
suits, like all cost recovery suits under § 107(a)(4)(B), are a viable,
if underutilized, tool for achieving CERCLA's purposes.
11 HR 7020, 126 Cong Rec at 25894 (cited in note 29). Representative Florio introduced
the original bill to the House. HR 7020, 96th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 2, 1980), in 126 Cong Rec
7490 (Apr 2, 1980).
40 See HR Rep No 96-1016, Part I, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 3-6 (1980).
41 HR 7020, § 5(a), 126 Cong Rec H9459 (daily ed, Sep 23, 1980).
42 See 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B).
4S See Senator Mitchell's remarks in note 15, for example.
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B. How CERCLA Works
CERCLA is designed to force responsible parties to pay for
hazardous waste cleanups.44 The chief means of achieving that goal
has been, and likely will continue to be, actions initiated and car-
ried out by the federal government. Although CERCLA includes a
provision for private individuals to clean up others' waste sites and
recover their costs of doing so, the focus of the Act is government
action.45 Some have called the Act a "shovels first, lawyers later"
statute because of its emphasis on action followed by litigation,46
but generally the lawyers (and very often the shovels) have be-
longed to federal agencies.4 This section first will outline the role
of federal agencies in enforcing CERCLA's mandate. It then will
discuss the role of private parties in completing that enforcement
scheme.
1. The role of the EPA.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") implements
most CERCLA programs.48 The EPA can use money from the
Superfund to clean up hazardous waste sites,49 and then replenish
the fund by suing the responsible parties to recover its costs.50 Al-
ternatively, the EPA can order private parties to clean up sites
themselves when there is an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public ... welfare or the environment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance."' 51 EPA ac-
tivities are the focal point of CERCLA enforcement.
4' See S Rep No 96-848 at 13 (cited in note 6).
4- 42 USC § 9604.
4 Paraphrasing comments of EPA assistant administrator Eckhardt C. Beck, quoted in
Steven Cohen, Defusing the Toxic Time Bomb: Federal Hazardous Waste Programs, in
Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds, Environmental Policy in the 1980's: Reagan's
New Agenda 282 (CQ Press, 1984).
4 Generally the EPA tries to get responsible parties to perform cleanups on their own
so that federal Superfund money need not be expended. Even under a best case scenario,
however, the federal government must expend resources to initiate the private clean up.
48 CERCLA authorizes the President to take actions, but the President may delegate
those powers. See 42 USC §§ 9611, 9615. President Reagan delegated much of his authority
to federal agencies, including the EPA. See Exec Order No 12,316, 3 CFR 168 (1981), as
amended by Exec Order No 12,418, 3 CFR 187 (1983).
', See 42 USC §§ 9604, 9611.
80 42 USC § 9607.
81 42 USC § 9606(a).
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2. The role of the ATSDR.
Medical monitoring cost cases raise issues involving another
federal agency that performs CERCLA duties, the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR") 2 In § 104(i)
of CERCLA, Congress established the ATSDR and charged it with
studying the health effects of hazardous substances." In the 1986
amendments to CERCLA, Congress greatly expanded the
ATSDR's role and responsibilities under the Act, and mandated
specific procedures for it to follow. 4 The ATSDR's activities now
include general research and assessment of the impact of toxic
chemicals on health, as well as health studies at specific hazardous
waste sites.5 5 The ATSDR is charged with conducting health as-
sessments at sites on, or proposed for placement on, the EPA's Na-
tional Priority List.56 In addition, the ATSDR may provide medi-
cal care and medical testing in cases of public emergency where
there has been exposure to toxic chemicals.57
It may appear that the ATSDR's duties overlap with, or even
preclude the need for, private medical monitoring suits. After all,
the agency must assess "the potential risk to human health posed
by individual sites and facilities. . . .,s However, the ATSDR cur-
rently performs health assessments only at sites already targeted
by the EPA-those sites listed on the NPL.59 Moreover, its duties
are distinct from the monitoring performed by private parties in
preparation for removal actions.60 While the ATSDR can serve as a
model for private monitoring programs, its existence does not pre-
clude those monitoring programs.
52 42 USC § 9604(i).
53Although CERCLA authorized the creation of the ATSDR in 1980, Congress did not
establish the agency until 1983. See Martin R. Siegel, Integrating Public Health Into
Superfund: What Has Been the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry?, 20 Envir L Rptr 10013, 10013-14 (1990).
" Id at 10013. The ATSDR's responsibilities now include: 1) preparation of a list of at
least 100 substances commonly found at hazardous sites; 2) preparation of "toxicological
profiles" of these substances; 3) initiation of a research program for substances for which
there is insufficient data; and 4) performance of "health assessments" to determine whether
human exposure to such substances should be minimized. 42 USC §§ 9604(i)(1), 9604(i)(2),
9604(i)(3), 9604(i)(5), 9604(i)(6).
55 42 USC § 9604(i)(6).
56 Id.
57 42 USC § 9601(i)(1)(D).
58 42 USC § 9604(i)(6)(F).
59 See Siegel, 20 Envir L Rptr at 10016-18 (cited in note 53).
60 See Section IV.C.
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3. The role of private parties-standards for private recovery
under section 107(a)(4)(B).
There is a third method of CERCLA cleanup, one that does
not involve federal actions: the private party response cost action.
The main hurdles that a plaintiff in a private response cost action
must overcome appear in the words of the statute. First, costs that
are incurred must be "consistent with the national contingency
plan"; second, the response costs must be "necessary"; and third,
the plaintiff cannot be responsible for creating the toxic site but
must be "any other person." 1 These three requirements are the
express starting points for any response cost recovery suit under
CERCLA. They must be addressed before examining the specific
issues involved in suits for medical monitoring costs.
a) Consistency. First, the private party's costs must be
consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). The
NCP, a set of regulations promulgated by the EPA, 62 guides gov-
ernment responses to hazardous waste emergencies. One of the
EPA's duties under the NCP was the creation of a National Priori-
ties List of sites that pose the greatest danger and that are most in
need of permanent, remedial actions.6 3 Although courts once strug-
gled in determining what it means for a party's costs to be "consis-
tent with" the NCP, 64 the answer is now fairly easy: the most re-
cent version of the NCP has a section titled "other party
responses" that helps define the meaning of that previously ambig-
uous phrase.6 5
6 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
2 42 USC § 9605(a). Actually, the President must "establish procedures and standards
for responding to releases of hazardous substances." President Reagan delegated this re-
sponsibility to the EPA. See note 48. The NCP is codified at 40 CFR § 300.1 (1991).
" 42 USC §§ 105(g), 105(f); 40 CFR Part 300, App B (1991) (National Priorities List
(By Rank) Feb 1991).
" For cases reading the consistency requirement liberally, see Pinole Point Properties,
Inc. v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F Supp 283, 290 (N D Cal 1984) (at the pleadings stage,
"consistency with the NCP ... does not require federal pre-authorization or supervision");
City of Philadelphia v Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F Supp 1135, 1144 n 16 (E D Pa 1982)
("the question df compliance with the ... [NCP] appears to be related to the recovery of
damages and not to the existence of a valid claim for relief"). For a case holding the consis-
tency requirement to be a significant hurdle, see Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F Supp at
1446 ("without an approved plan, there can be no ... clean-up effort consistent with the
NCP").
11 See 40 CFR §§ 300.700(c)(3)(i), 300.700(c)(3)(ii):
(i) A private party response action will be considered "consistent with the NCP" if the
action ... is in substantial compliance with .. . [the regulations] and results in a
CERCLA-quality cleanup; (ii) Any response action carried out in compliance with the
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b) Necessary. Although the NCP has clarified the mean-
ing of "consistency," the question of what constitute "necessary
costs of response" is harder to answer. CERCLA never defines
"necessary" or "costs of response." However, CERCLA does define
"response" to mean "removal, remedy, and remedial action." '66
"Removal," in turn, includes "such actions as may be necessary
taken [sic] in the event of the threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances into the environment .. to monitor, assess, and evaluate
the release or threat of release ... to prevent, minimize, or miti-
gate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment.
.. 67 And "remedy" or "remedial action" means "those actions
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition
to removal actions . . ."" In short, these definitions are circular;
they define "necessary costs of response" by using the word
''necessary."
Because CERCLA offers little guidance regarding the purpose
or scope of the response cost provision, it is not surprising that this
issue must be litigated in almost every case. In fact, broadly speak-
ing this Comment is an attempt to decide whether medical moni-
toring costs are a "necessary" cost of response under CERCLA.
The "necessary" issue is at the heart of this and every other
§ 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action.
c) Other party. Some courts have read the literal words
of the statute to include a final burden. They have held that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) plaintiffs must not be among the class of "poten-
tially responsible parties" who could be liable for the release.6 9
While this issue is important in the hotly contested areas of lender
and transporter liability" under CERCLA, it is a minor point in
cases for medical monitoring costs. Parties who bring medical mon-
itoring suits generally are innocent injured parties and do not own
the land at issue, and are thus "other parties". For instance, in
each of the eight medical monitoring cases considered in Section
terms of an order issued by EPA pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA, or a consent
decree ... will be considered "consistent with the NCP."
66 42 USC § 9601(25).
67 42 USC § 9601(23).
-8 42 USC § 9601(24).
69 The seminal case is Stepan Chemical, 544 F Supp at 1141-42. While the court in
Stepan allowed the city to sue despite its ownership of the landfill at issue, it indicated that
a party responsible for dumping would not be allowed to sue. Id.
"0 See, for example, Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv
L Rev 1458 (1986).
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III below, the suit was brought by citizens groups and/or neighbor-
ing landowners who could not be considered potentially responsi-
ble parties.
III. MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS CASES IN THE COURTS
Medical monitoring cost cases under CERCLA are a recent in-
novation. To date no federal appellate court has decided a case
involving medical monitoring costs, and the district court cases
that have addressed the issue have been at the summary judgment
stage. No court has awarded medical monitoring costs; those courts
that have denied the costs often have treated the suits as actions
for medical treatment expenses. This section nevertheless will con-
sider the rationales of the district courts that have argued in favor
and against medical monitoring costs.
The first court to consider carefully whether medical monitor-
ing costs should be awarded rejected them outright. In Chaplin v
Exxon Co., 71 the district court used three rationales for granting
summary judgment against a request for medical monitoring re-
sponse costs. First, the court noted that "[t]he legislative history
reveals the specific omission of such private rights from the final
version [of CERCLA]. ' ' 72 The court also noted that the ATSDR
had the exclusive responsibility for medical monitoring:
Although CERCLA does not ignore medical concerns, such
medical care provisions are separate from the liability provi-
sions of Section 9607. Specifically, Congress created the
[ATSDR] in Section 104(i) of CERCLA to provide medical
care and testing to exposed individuals .... 73
Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs' complaint did not "'af-
firmatively demonstrate that [they had] incurred necessary costs of
response.' 7" That is, it rejected medical monitoring costs because
of their prospective nature. Courts that refuse to grant reimburse-
71 25 Envir Rptr (BNA) 2009 (S D Tex 1986). Actually, the first case to deal with medi-
cal costs was Jones v Inmont Corp., 584 F Supp 1425 (S D Ohio 1984), in which a suit for
investigatory expenses, including medical monitoring costs, was allowed to proceed against a
summary judgment motion. Because it did not specifically comment on the propriety of
medical monitoring costs, it is not clear, however, how carefully the district court considered
the inclusion of medical monitoring costs.
72 Chaplin, 25 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 2011 (emphasis added).
73 Id at 2012.
74 Id at 2013 (quoting Levin Metals Corp. v Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 608 F Supp
1272, 1275 (N D Cal 1985)).
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ment of medical monitoring costs continue to rely on these three
arguments.75 They will be considered carefully below.
In contrast, a number of courts have rejected the arguments
made in Chaplin and its progeny and have viewed medical moni-
toring expenses more favorably.76 As noted above, no court has yet
affirmatively awarded medical response costs, but the reasoning of
certain courts at the summary judgment stage indicates that those
courts likely would allow for the recovery of such costs. One such
case is Brewer v Ravan. In Brewer, the court agreed with Chaplin
that: "CERCLA's legislative history clearly indicates that medical
expenses incurred in the treatment of personal injuries or disease
caused by an unlawful release or discharge of hazardous substances
are not recoverable under section 9607(a). 77 However, the Brewer
court went on to distinguish its reasoning from Chaplin's:
To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover the cost of medi-
cal testing and screening conducted to assess the effect of the
release or discharge on public health or to identify potential
public health problems presented by the release, however,
they present a cognizable claim under section 9607(a) .7
Thus the court rejected claims for medical treatment expenses, but
recognized that medical testing could be a part of a program fur-
thering CERCLA's broad purpose to aid the "public health." The
Brewer court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that medical mon-
itoring costs were potentially a permissible use of § 107(a)(4)(B) to
further that broad purpose.
Chaplin and Brewer show that the conflict in the courts is
both fundamental and significant: the conflict centers around the
characterization of the claims. Some courts characterize the plain-
tiffs' claims not as investigatory response cost actions, but as suits
to recover medical damages. These courts reject monitoring costs
75 For a sampling of courts essentially following Chaplin's lead, see Wehner v Syntex
Corp., 681 F Supp 651, 653 (N D Cal 1987); Coburn v Sun Chemical Corp., 28 Envir Rptr
(BNA) 1665, 1668-69 (E D Pa 1988); Lutz v Chromatex, Inc., 718 F Supp 413, 418 (M D Pa
1989); Werlein v United States, 746 F Supp 887, 903 (D Minn 1990).
76 Brewer, 680 F Supp at 1179; Inmont, 584 F Supp at 1429-30; SEPTA, 24 Envir Rptr
(BNA) at 1863.
77 680 F Supp at 1179 (emphasis in original).
78 Id (emphasis in original). For courts that expressly follow Brewer or employ similar
reasoning, see Lykins v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 27 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1590, 1594 (E D
Ky 1988); Williams v Allied Automotive, 28 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1223 (N D Ohio 1988).
Brewer is not the first case to argue that medical monitoring costs are permissible response
costs under § 107(a)(4)(B), but it explores the issue the most thoroughly. For earlier cases
permitting medical monitoring expenses with little discussion, see Inmont, 584 F Supp at
1429-30; SEPTA, 24 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 1863.
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as a matter of course. The courts that are more receptive to al-
lowing recovery of medical monitoring costs distinguish monitoring
from treatment, and maintain that medical monitoring may be a
viable investigatory cost under CERCLA. As the next section ar-
gues, the latter courts both read the Act and characterize the
claims correctly.
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING COSTS AND CERCLA's PURPOSES
The key question courts face when deciding whether to permit
a private recovery of medical monitoring costs under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA is whether such a recovery would fur-
ther the Act's purposes in a manner consistent with the statutory
framework. Part A of this section suggests that courts can answer
this question correctly only if they understand medical monitoring
suits as suits for response costs. Part B introduces an additional
complication: the federal government's problems in enforcing
CERCLA. If the federal government were administering CERCLA
effectively, enforcement questions might be more easily answered:
involvement by other parties could be minimized to avoid wasteful,
duplicitous suits. Yet, as will be seen below, sites are not being
cleaned up fast enough when they are being cleaned up at all.
This section concludes, in Part C, that medical monitoring
costs further CERCLA's purposes in a manner consistent with the
Act's framework. Medical monitoring suits are private enforcement
mechanisms that serve the public good efficiently; they can com-
pensate for the federal government's problems in enforcing CER-
CLA. Because Congress designed the Act to allow for the use of
public and private resources to further the broad public purpose of
environmental cleanup, and because the government has been less
than successful in this regard, courts should make presumptions in
favor of private enforcement actions.79 Expanding the private role
is the best way to effectuate CERCLA's broad purpose: cleaning up
hazardous wastes for everyone's benefit.8 0
11 One commentator has noted the problems in federal administration of CERCLA, and
has argued in favor of an expanded state role in the Act's enforcement. See Comment, Ex-
panding State Initiation and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U Chi L Rev 985, 986
(1990). Yet while the federal government has budgetary and organizational constraints, so
do the states. Creating a presumption in favor of citizen suits and allowing more of them
would relieve burdens from both the federal and state governments.
' I do not mean to argue that every time a federal statute is not working well govern-
ment enforcement should be turned over to private actors. Nevertheless, CERCLA does
have a private enforcement provision built in, and its increased use will facilitate better
CERCLA implementation.
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A. Characterizing Medical Monitoring Costs in the Courts
The chief difference between the courts that reject claims for
recovery of medical monitoring costs and those that do not is the
way they characterize the claims at the outset. Courts such as the
one in Chaplin understand medical monitoring suits to be an at-
tempt to recover medical damages.81 But in cases such as Brewer,
the courts construe the suit differently.82 They see a meaningful
difference between medical expenses for treatment and medical
monitoring costs. Thus they are inclined to consider the plaintiffs'
arguments and allow recovery of those costs. This Comment argues
that the view in Brewer and its progeny better serves CERCLA's
purposes.
1. Chaplin.
In Chaplin v Exxon Corp., the court held that medical ex-
penses could not be recovered under § 107(a)(4)(B) because Con-
gress intended to remove provisions for their recovery from the fi-
nal CERCLA bill.83 The Chaplin court focused on Congress's
removal of the private right of action for personal damages from
the final bill. The court thus seemed to confuse private recovery of
treatment expenses with recovery of monitoring expenses for the
public purpose of cleaning up the environment. 84 As was seen
above, CERCLA does not authorize private damage suits, but it
does permit cost recoveries for the broader public good of environ-
mental cleanup. The Chaplin court thus mischaracterized the suit
from the outset. Its subsequent legal arguments were tainted by its
initial misstep.
The Chaplin court in fact contradicted its first point by later
invoking the existence of the ATSDR. By arguing that medical
monitoring costs should be administered by the ATSDR, the
Chaplin court implicitly admitted that the issue was medical test-
ing, and not medical treatment, thus contradicting its first point.
Moreover, the argument that the ATSDR should control all medi-
cal testing procedures was wrong substantively, because the agency
has come to be used solely in remedial actions performed by the
81 See text accompanying notes 83-87.
8'2 See text accompanying notes 88-89.
" 25 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 2011.
84 Id.
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EPA and has not been connected to private actions for response
costs.
8 5
The Chaplin court used a third argument against medical
monitoring, namely that investigatory costs are not "affirmative
showings" of response costs.8 6 This point is wrong if cases such as
Wickland Oil and Artesian Water-which represent the nearly
unanimous position that ongoing and future monitoring costs may
be recovered under § 107(a)(4)(B) as investigatory costs-are to be
followed.8 7 In light of these precedents, the Chaplin court offered
no good reasons to distinguish medical monitoring costs from other
investigatory expenses. As long as medical monitoring is a useful
part of private cleanup actions, it presumably should be treated
the same way as other investigatory costs. The Chaplin court's re-
action showed its disfavor of all private response cost actions.
2. Brewer.
The court in Brewer v Ravan distinguished its reasoning from
the Chaplin court's views."" The Brewer court saw a crucial differ-
ence between "public health" and "personal injuries or disease,"
which mirrors Congress's compromise in establishing
§ 107(a)(4)(B). The court permitted the plaintiff's claim for medi-
cal monitoring costs to proceed past summary judgment, and al-
lowed the plaintiffs to recover costs of medical testing, because
that testing served to protect the public at large from the ill effects
of hazardous substance releases.8 9 In so doing, the Brewer court
avoided the Chaplin court's mistake of mischaracterizing the
claim. The court also did not invoke the ATSDR nor did it limit
the scope of investigatory cost recoveries. The court realized that
individual remedies are beyond CERCLA's scope, but that the Act
does permit private actions to protect the environment and the
health of the population at large.
85 See Section II.B.2.
" 25 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 2013 (quoting Levin Metals Corp. v Parr-Richmond Termi-
nal Corp., 608 F Supp 1272, 1275 (N D Cal 1985)).
87 See text accompanying notes 22-23.
Brewer, 680 F Supp at 1179.
8 Id ("To the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover the cost of medical testing and
screening conducted to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public health or to
identify potential public health problems presented by the release, they present a cogniza-
ble claim under § 9607(a).") (emphasis in original).
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3. Difficulties in the Brewer formulation.
Although Brewer makes the better argument, there are
problems with awards of medical monitoring costs that the court
did not confront. The first difficulty concerns defining the word
"monitoring" in a meaningful way. In Coburn v Sun Chemical
Corp, the court reviewed many of the key cases and decided explic-
itly to reject Brewer,90 largely on its interpretation of the definition
of that term:
[T]he Brewer court's determination that "[p]ublic-health re-
lated medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to
'monitor, assess, [or] evaluate a release'" contravenes the
plain meaning of that phrase. Quite simply, we find it difficult
to understand how future medical testing and monitoring of
persons ... will do anything to "monitor, assess, [or] evaluate
a release" of contamination from the site.9 1
Put more simply, it was unclear to the court in Coburn what medi-
cal monitoring is and how it should work. Although Coburn used
many of the arguments used in Chaplin2 (it appears, for instance,
that it mistook medical monitoring for a species of medical treat-
ment), its point is still valid. Before determining whether medical
monitoring expenses should be granted, a party must show that
these response costs really can be effective."
A second problem that was left unanswered by Brewer is the
potential for abuse. It is possible that if medical monitoring ex-
penses are awarded with regularity, parties will begin to sue for
monitoring costs as a "back door" method of recovering medical
treatment costs under CERCLA. In fact, at least one court has ap-
peared to refuse to award medical expenses for this reason.94 Yet
an argument based on the potential for abuse is easily countered.
First, if this argument holds, it puts awards of all investigatory
costs in jeopardy: the potential for fraud or abuse is high in all
such cases. More specifically, it is unclear that the risk of abuse is
a sufficient reason to limit recoveries; rather, abuse is better con-
trolled by more careful judicial scrutiny. Courts should review the
28 Envir Rptr (BNA) 1665, 1670-71 (E D Pa 1988).
" Id at 1671.
,2 Id at 1670.
93 This criterion will be the cornerstone of the test that I will develop in Section V.
" Werlein v United States, 746 F Supp 887, 904 (D Minn 1990) (plaintiffs sought costs
for monitoring exposure to chemicals; court held that relief sought was "primarily personal
treatment for disease").
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facts carefully, and should allow medical monitoring costs only
when they are warranted.9 5
B. Enforcement Anomalies
Since CERCLA's enactment, the government has initiated
most cleanups. This need not be. A change is necessary, in fact, to
overcome the myriad problems that the government has had in en-
forcing CERCLA: budgetary constraints, mismanagement, and
general indecision about the Act and environmental law in general.
The focus of CERCLA implementation must be moved (at least
partially) from the public to the private sector. Medical monitoring
costs are an important part of such a shift. Courts should en-
courage private cleanups as well as testing procedures to facilitate
those cleanups. In this way they can counteract the problems in
the government's administration of CERCLA.
1. Enforcement by the EPA.
Money, of course, is the greatest constraint on the EPA's
CERCLA enforcement capabilities. Like many federal agencies,
the EPA has been forced to bear part of the burden of the federal
deficit by facing budget cuts. During the 1980s the EPA's budget-
ary problems were enormous. In the middle of the decade its
Superfund budget was smaller than in 1981.96 In the past three
years, the EPA's budget has nominally increased fifty-four percent,
but when adjusted for inflation, the agency's overall budget has
risen only sixteen percent since 1979-while its workload has
doubled. These budgetary problems make it increasingly onerous
for the EPA adequately to enforce CERCLA and other environ-
mental statutes.
A second problem with relying on the EPA to effectuate the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites is the attitude that at times may
take hold in the agency. For instance, consistent with then-Presi-
"' No court has argued (nor does this Comment) that costs should be granted in a case
such as Werlein, where the plaintiffs did appear to be trying to recover medical treatment
costs by calling them medical monitoring costs. Werlein arguably is consistent with Brewer
and its progeny; it denied response costs simply because they were not warranted on the
facts. For more on the problem of untrustworthy medical monitoring claims see Section V.
96 See Environmental Aspects of President Reagan's Proposed Fiscal 1985 Budget, 14
Envir Rptr (BNA) 1715 (1984). In 1985, the EPA's operating budget was $1.209 billion, in
contrast to $1.353 billion in 1981. Id.
97 President Bush requested $1.75 billion for Superfund for fiscal year 1993. See Brad
Knickerbocker, White House Increases Budget, Action On Environmental Issues, Christian
Sci Mon 6 (Jan 28, 1992).
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dent Reagan's policy of deregulation, the EPA became an agency
known for its compromises with and closeness to the industries it
is charged with regulating. President Reagan's first EPA adminis-
trator, Anne Gorsuch Burford, became infamous as a friend of in-
dustry before she unceremoniously stepped down from her post."'
More recently, Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitive-
ness has acted on behalf of the business community to assure that
"'economic" interests be considered in environmental regulation
decisions. Critics charge that EPA administrator William Reilly
may have been intimidated into inaction by this group at least
once. 9 With these industry pressures on the EPA, it is difficult for
the agency to enforce CERCLA effectively.
A final point that shows that the EPA's enforcement of CER-
CLA cannot be successful on its own is the small size of the
Superfund. Before the 1986 SARA amendments the Superfund
contained $1.6 billion. This may seem like a great deal of money,
but it must be remembered that as of 1985 there were estimated to
be 10,000 waste disposal sites that would require as much as $100
billion to clean up. 100 Given these figures, the EPA's mission seems
hopeless if it is to clean up all hazardous wastes sites on its own.
2. Enforcement by the ATSDR.
The ATSDR performs health assessments similar to those in
medical monitoring suits.'' Yet the ATSDR does not fill the need
for determining the risks to people's health. Two related factors
indicate that private enforcement is an important supplement to
the ATSDR's duties if health risks are to be assessed at all hazard-
ous waste sites.
First, for the site-specific assessments required by § 104(i)(6),
the ATSDR's health assessments almost always occur at National
Priority List sites at which the EPA is performing or is considering
9 See Superfund II: A New Mandate-A BNA Special Report 9-12 (Feb 13, 1987).
" Dana Priest, Competitiveness Council Suspected of Unduly Influencing Regulators;
Secretary Foils Senate Panel's Attempt to Probe Vice President's Group, Wash Post A19
(Nov 18, 1991) (reporting on allegations that Reilly "was forced to withdraw a trash re-
cycling initiative that the council saw as too burdensome to owners and operators of munici-
pal incinerators").
00 See Philip Shabecoff, Toxic Waste Threat Termed Far Greater Than US Esti-
mates, NY Times I (Mar 10, 1985).
101 See Section II.B.2.
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performing a remedial action.0 2 The ATSDR may in its discretion
perform assessments at other sites, but it has not. This most likely
results from understaffing and budgetary constraints. 03 So, at
smaller sites that are not on the NPL-the very sites at which pri-
vate parties may consider undertaking removal actions them-
selves-there is no ATSDR involvement.10
4
A second reason that the ATSDR's work needs to be supple-
mented by private actions is the agency's preference for assessing
broad health concerns over site-specific ones.105 In light of the 1986
SARA amendments to CERCLA, the ATSDR has channeled
nearly all of its resources into long-term studies, leaving the health
effects at smaller sites unstudied. 0 6 Thus, there are countless haz-
ardous waste sites for which private testing programs may be the
only hope for studying adverse health effects. Because the ATSDR
spends most *of its resources dealing with broad health testing is-
sues and because the agency views its mandate as involving long-
term research, there is room for private parties to monitor health
effects as part of removal actions.
This discussion points to an almost inevitable conclusion: If
the hazardous waste problem in the United States ever is to be
remedied, the focus of CERCLA enforcement must be changed. A
mere increase in federal expenditures is not a reliable or likely so-
lution. Similarly, because federal agencies do not always spend
wisely the money that is appropriated for them, 07 increasing their
budget may be a waste more than a panacea. Other steps are es-
sential if CERCLA is to be enforced more completely.
I"2 The ATSDR "shall consider the National Priorities List schedules and the needs of
the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal agencies pursuant to schedules for
remedial investigation and feasibility studies." 42 USC § 9604(i)(6)(C).
103 As of June 1989, the ATSDR received individual requests for site studies forty-nine
times; they completed five of those and rejected one; the five they performed were for sites
either on, or proposed for, the NPL. See Siegel, 20 Envir L Rptr at 10013 (cited in note 53).
104 In a recent case, the court refused a medical monitoring claim because
§ 9604(i)(6)(B) allows private parties to petition the ATSDR to perform health assessments.
Ambrogi v Gould, Inc., 750 F Supp 1233, 1249 (M D Pa 1990). However, the ATSDR may
refuse to perform the assessments with a written explanation, and testing contemplated
under § 9607(a) "is distinct from the health assessment studies available under section
9604(i) [ATSDR] .... " Cook, 755 F Supp at 1474.
10' See Siegel, 20 Envir L Rptr at 10014-17 (cited in note 53).
10 Id at 10017.
10' Associated Press, Overhead Costs Spur Superfund Scrutiny, Chi Trib 8 (Oct 3,
1991) (reporting on EPA investigation reporting "inappropriate" EPA expenditures to con-
tractors performing toxic waste cleanup).
[59:925
Medical Monitoring
C. Private Enforcement of Public Rights
1. Private rights of action in environmental statutes.
CERCLA does not give individuals the right to compel federal
agencies or private parties to act. 08 Nevertheless, § 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA does permit parties to clean up hazardous sites on their
own, and to recover "costs of response" from responsible pol-
luters. 09 Other environmental statutes also have private right of
action provisions. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970110 and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (known as the Clean
Water Act) Amendments of 1972,"' for example, contain provi-
sions to supplement agency enforcement with the work of private
parties."2 Though some commentators maintain that the private
enforcement sections of these and other statutes have not been ef-
fective," 3 others argue persuasively that with adjustments, and
with a focus on particularly important factors, private rights of ac-
tion can be a useful tool in environmental cleanups." 4
2. Academic views on private enforcement of public law.
The issue of medical monitoring response costs fits in with a
longstanding academic debate over the advisability of private en-
forcement of publicly-oriented statutes. CERCLA and other envi-
108 See, for example, Cadillac Fairview/California v Dow Chemical Co., 840 F2d 691,
696-97 (9th Cir 1988) (using structural and expressio unius arguments to deny an extension
of the government's right of compulsion under § 106 to private parties suing under § 107).
.09 42 USC § 9607(a)(4)(B).
21 42 USC §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp 1991). Congress substantially amended the
Clean Air Act in 1990, but the amendments did not change the citizen suits provision.
... 33 USC §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
112 For the Clean Air Act, see 42 USC § 7604(a) ("any person" can sue). See also Report
of the Committee on Public Works, S Rep No 92-414, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 79 (1971) ("[t]he
Committee has established a provision in the bill that would provide citizen participation in
the enforcement of control requirements and regulations"). For the Clean Water Act, see 33
USC § 1365(a) ("any citizen" can sue). See also Floor Debate on S 4358, 91st Cong, 2d Sess
(Sep 21, 1970), in Cong Rec 32927 (Sep 21, 1970) ("citizens can be a useful instrument for
detecting violations and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and
courts alike").
113 See, for example, Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the
Pace, 9 Harv Envir L Rev 23, 29-35 (1985) (citizen suits have been uncommon and could be
more effective).
114 See, for example, id at 74-82; David Allan Feller, Private Enforcement of Federal
Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60 Denver L J 553, 571 (1983) ("As
federal enforcement efforts are directed away from the C[lean] A[ir] A[ct] and [the] C[lean]
W[ater] A[ct], and the degradation of the environment becomes an expanding threat, the
use of citizen suits to enforce anti-pollution -laws becomes correspondingly more attractive
and feasible.").
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ronmental statutes are easier to construe in this regard than are
many other statutes. Because Congress supplied private enforce-
ment provisions in these environmental statutes, there is no need
for courts to imply a private right of action under them. The ques-
tion raised by this Comment-whether CERCLA's private action
section should be read broadly to effectuate the Act's purpose by
supplementing the efforts of federal agencies-does, however, im-
plicate general questions regarding the public law/private enforce-
ment paradigm.
Professors Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein have written
exhaustively on the pros and cons of private enforcement of public
statutes." 5 They believe that in some ways private enforcement is
a "paradox" because agencies are created, in part, to escape "un-
democratic" private litigation.'16 Nevertheless, Stewart and Sun-
stein conclude that private suits are favorable if two criteria are
met and six factors are present." 7 The two criteria are straightfor-
ward. First, the agency must be shown to have devoted inadequate
resources to compliance, or simply to lack sanctions to achieve en-
forcement; second, the cost of private enforcement must not be
greater than the cost of agency action."18 The six factors that the
authors discuss all involve efficiency problems. In particular, the
six factors guard against inefficient, "overinclusive" enforcement." 9
That is, there is an optimal level of enforcement, above which pri-
vate actors who supplement agency action actually may prove
wasteful. 2 ' In such a situation, private enforcement would be un-
warranted. Stewart and Sunstein's work is a good framework for
deciding whether the private right of action under § 107(a)(4)(B)
of CERCLA should be read broadly, and whether medical monitor-
ing suits should be favored. The next section uses that framework
to argue that allowing recovery of medical monitoring response
costs would produce a near optimal level of CERCLA enforcement.
D. Private Suits for Medical Monitoring Costs
Medical monitoring suits under § 107(a)(4)(B) meet the crite-
ria developed by Stewart and Sunstein. First, as was argued above,
"' Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
Harv L Rev 1193 (1982).
"~ Id at 1294.
117 Id at 1296-98.
I' Id at 1296.
19 Id at 1307.
120 Id at 1296-97.
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the EPA and the ATSDR both underenforce their mandates. The
policies of and resources available to those agencies make it un-
likely that they will effectively clean up hazardous waste sites and
sufficiently test for their effects. Second, in the area of medical
monitoring, the cost of private enforcement does not exceed the
cost of agency action. Not only do private suits for medical testing
costs cost less, but they actually may save government money be-
cause they do not use the resources of the Superfund.
As for the efficiency factors that must be met to avoid "over-
enforcement," there are three good reasons to favor recovery of
medical monitoring costs. First, although all CERCLA suits in-
volve-to some extent-the environment and human health, medi-
cal monitoring suits directly implicate health problems that may
already be dangerous and could be getting worse daily. There is an
immediate danger in these cases that must be met with vigorous
responses. Allowing recovery of private medical monitoring
costs-even if it leads to some overenforcement-should be en-
dorsed so as to better protect human life. Yet, as will be shown
below, courts will be able to minimize overenforcement difficulties
by exercising sound discretion in allowing such claims to go
forward.
The second argument in favor of medical monitoring suits
(and other prospective recoveries under CERCLA) is efficiency.
Testing procedures cost money, but they save money in the long
run. When private parties begin removal actions without full infor-
mation, they may waste time and resources. Medical monitoring
may provide the parties with additional, fuller information. Medi-
cal monitoring may have another efficiency component as well:
every time a person's cancer is spotted at an early stage, the bur-
den of enormous future medical costs may be decreased. Though
medical monitoring is an assessment stage in preparation for a re-
moval action, the ancillary effect of saving money in separate dam-
ages suits12 1 is not inconsistent with CERCLA's purposes. Private
suits for medical monitoring costs thus may be a valuable part of
response cost actions and should be favored.
12, The plaintiffs may save the added costs, but more likely the defendants will be
spared from state toxic tort litigation for damages. The government saves money as well,
both by avoiding the institutional costs of additional litigation and by not having to pay
Medicaid or other federally-sponsored medical expenses for those who are not insured,
never tested, and not compensated.
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Finally, CERCLA is the result of a congressional policy choice
to make cleanup of hazardous wastes the priority.122 Congress's
choice implies that it considered cost to be only a secondary con-
cern. This means that to some extent slight overenforcement
problems could be tolerated. Nevertheless, as will be shown be-
low, 123 courts are competent to decide on the merits of each case
whether a private cleanup is warranted.
All of the criteria and factors of Stewart and Sunstein's para-
digm favor reading § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA to allow recovery
for medical monitoring costs. Medical testing can be an effective
means of furthering CERCLA's broad public goals that does not
lead to "inefficient" enforcement. Private parties that sue for med-
ical monitoring response costs serve the environment and the
"public health."
V. A TEST FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL MONITORING COST
RECOVERY CASES
The purpose of this final section is to distinguish cases in
which medical monitoring costs should be awarded from those
cases in which they should not. A medical monitoring program that
is carefully constructed to provide information to assist in cleaning
up a waste site can be a useful part of a removal action under
CERCLA. Recall the complaint in Brewer v Ravan. The plaintiffs
in Brewer planned to test the water and soil around the waste site
and also intended to monitor the health of the people who lived
nearby. The medical monitoring program that withstood a motion
for summary judgment was an integral part of the plaintiffs' pri-
vate removal action. In cases such as Brewer, medical monitoring
costs under § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA ought to be granted.
Yet not all cases are as clear as Brewer. Courts must deter-
mine whether individual cases further CERCLA's goals or whether
they are redundant actions that do not add to the EPA's and the
ATSDR's enforcement potentials. To help courts avoid ad hoc de-
terminations, I suggest the following test, which includes factors
courts should consider in deciding whether to permit recovery for
medical monitoring costs.
122 See S Rep No 96-848 (cited in note 6).
123 See Section V.C.
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A. Defining Medical Monitoring Costs
In a medical monitoring cost case, the court must first deter-
mine what the plaintiff actually seeks to recover-whether the
plaintiff actually seeks medical monitoring costs. This difficulty in
characterization plagued the Brewer court's formulation. 124 The
Brewer court noted a difference between costs for "medical testing
and screening" and those for "personal injuries or disease,' l 5 but
never mapped out a way to distinguish the two. The court in
Coburn criticized Brewer on exactly these grounds, and rejected
medical monitoring costs as a viable response cost in part because
it felt that a meaningful line could not be drawn. 126
Private litigants who wish to move forward with suits for med-
ical monitoring response costs should meet three burdens. First,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that a system of testing has been
established or is ready for immediate implementation. Then, they
must demonstrate that the testing procedures are tailored to deter-
mine the effects of substances that are known or suspected to be
present at the particular site. They must document the substances
at issue and the scientific design of the study to be undertaken.
Finally, the parties must be prepared to show that it is the entire
community (around the site) that is being tested, not just the
named plaintiffs. This last burden protects against charges that
only the plaintiffs are profiting from the enterprise. Once these
three burdens are met, the court should determine that the costs of
response will enable parties to "monitor, assess, and evaluate [a]
release or threat of release,' 2 7 and are therefore recoverable.
B. Safeguarding Against Potential Abuse or Inefficiency
In Werlein v United States, ss the court compared cases such
as Brewer (that permitted medical monitoring suits to move for-
ward) with those like Coburn (that rejected the claims outright).
The Werlein court first argued that it could not "locate any au-
thority" in § 107(a)(4)(B) to allow medical monitoring as a re-
sponse cost. 29 The court equivocated, however, and implied that it
12 680 F Supp at 1179. See text accompanying notes 16-18.
125 Id.
126 28 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 1671.
127 42 USC § 9601(23) (defining "removal"). Once medical monitoring costs are estab-
lished as consistent with investigatory removal actions, courts will be more likely to grant
response costs.
128 746 F Supp at 902.
129 Id at 904.
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rejected Brewer because of doubts whether monitoring costs were
warranted on the facts at hand.
Werlein shows that a major issue that may drive a court's de-
cision is whether the court perceives that the suit is an attempt to
recover medical treatment expenses disguised as a claim for medi-
'cal monitoring costs. The Werlein court did not go as far as the
court in Chaplin, which had held that all medical monitoring suits
are veiled attempts to recover treatment costs; it was more dis-
criminating. The court stated that it would consider permitting a
medical monitoring suit in other circumstances, but that the plain-
tiffs before it really sought only expenses for medical treatment.
Other courts seem to refuse medical monitoring expenses at least
partially out of fear that the plaintiffs are trying to circumvent
CERCLA's denial of treatment costs.130 An important hurdle for
private parties to jump is proving that the suit is not a "back-
door" method of recovering medical treatment expenses.
To guard against this problem, a court must first be sure that
the plaintiffs have devised a satisfactory testing program before it
permits a medical monitoring cost suit to proceed. 131 The program
must be calibrated to fit an overall removal plan; otherwise the
monitoring program could be a ruse. Then the court must deter-
mine whether the parties have a reason to use a back-door ap-
proach to reimbursement for medical treatment. One reason would
be lack of medical insurance, another would be the problems of
ongoing and speculative injuries. 132 With careful scrutiny of the
true purposes behind a medical monitoring case, a court need not
reject a suit due to lingering doubts about the possibility of abuse.
C. Inefficient Enforcement
The final criterion for the propriety of a medical monitoring
suit follows from some of the efficiency concerns discussed above.
Where the ATSDR and EPA are performing adequately, suits to
create private testing programs simply would get in the way or
would be duplicative. However, rather than preclude all recoveries
out of fears that they may be unnecessary in some situations,
130 See, for example, Chaplin, 25 Envir Rptr (BNA) at 2011. Courts that reject medical
monitoring claims outright either correctly characterize such costs or believe plaintiffs in-
tend to seek medical treatment costs. See Section IV.A.
"' See Section IV.A.
132 Arguably the harms caused by hazardous wastes always have this effect. However, a
court must be prepared to distinguish programs that are designed to provide treatment from
true monitoring programs that are connected to removal actions.
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judges should focus on the case at hand. If the ATSDR is estab-
lishing a testing program and the EPA is planning to clean up the
site, it is not likely that private actions will be brought; pending
suits will be dropped. Courts should look carefully at the facts at
hand and dismiss a case for overlapping enforcement only when
that problem actually exists.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated that CERCLA provides for a
private right of action whose use is both consistent with the Act's
purposes and useful for enforcing the Act's broader goals. The
Comment has shown that the private suit for medical monitoring
costs (which often is misunderstood to be a suit for medical treat-
ment costs) is an important tool for the private litigant. Medical
monitoring is an efficient use of private resources that can supple-
ment public implementation of CERCLA. Judges should under-
stand that sometimes an individual's trip to the doctor may benefit
us all.
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